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This paper revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage
them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments.
Firms account for this diﬀerence when hiring a worker. When a worker ﬁrst meets a ﬁrm,
the ﬁrm oﬀers the worker a suﬃcient share of the match rents to avoid a bidding war in the
future. The pair share the gains to trade. In this case, the Diamond paradox no longer holds.
JEL classiﬁcations: J24, J42, J64.
Keywords: Job search, recall, wage determination, Diamond paradox
1. Introduction
This paper analyzes the role of recall in job search. When a worker meets a potential employer, a
wage oﬀer from the ﬁrm is a bid for the worker’s services in an auction. If workers have memories
that allow them to recall previous encounters with potential employers, these workers have the
capacity to alter the number of bidders for their services, induce Bertrand bidding and thereby
obtain high wages. Without a recall option in bilateral matching, ﬁrms are monopsonists. As
Diamond (1971) illustrates, these ﬁrms oﬀer low wages that capture the gains to trade.
The standard search model plays down the recall option and focuses on the single bidder
outcome. In this literature (e.g. McCall, 1970; Mortensen, 1970; Albrecht and Axell, 1984), if
traders fail to agree to terms, they break-up, the match dissolves entirely, and potential trading
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point out, the no-recall assumption is innocuous given that previous bids are ﬁxed. In a stationary
world, rejected oﬀers do not become acceptable when viewed a second time around.
This argument assumes that ﬁrms will not revise their wage oﬀer when called upon again,
possibly in diﬀerent circumstances. Recalled bidders, however, have an incentive to update their
oﬀers to account for the competition for the worker.1 When there are no competing bidders,
the ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to oﬀer the worker’s reservation wage, i.e. the wage that makes the
worker indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting the job. In contrast, when there are competing
bidders, the ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to oﬀer a wage slightly higher than those oﬀered by the other
bidders. As a result, when there are competing bidders, every ﬁrm oﬀers its own reservation
wage, i.e. the wage that makes the ﬁrm indiﬀerent between hiring and not hiring the worker.2
When ﬁrms are able to update their wage oﬀers, the possibility of recall fundamentally alters
the equilibrium of the economy. Without recall, it is well understood (see Diamond, 1971; Burdett
and Judd, 1983; Albrecht and Axel, 1984) that every employed worker earns the monopsony wage,
no matter how small the search frictions are. With recall, forward looking ﬁrms avoid a future
bidding war by oﬀering enough at the initial encounter. A worker continuing with job search has
a chance of generating a wage that is strictly greater than the monopsony wage, so the incumbent
ﬁrm must oﬀer the worker a fraction of the gains from trade to make him take the job. With
recall, every employed worker earns a wage strictly greater than the monopsony wage. Moreover,
this wage converges to the competitive wage as the search frictions become arbitrarily small.3
The intuition is straightforward. When a ﬁrm is the sole bidder for a worker, it oﬀers a wage
that makes the worker indiﬀerent between becoming employed and continuing to search. If the
worker continues to search, he may ﬁnd a second bidder and engage the two ﬁrms in a bidding
war. In order to convince the worker to forgo the option of searching, the ﬁrm has to oﬀer a wage
that is higher than the monopsony wage even when the ﬁrm is the sole bidder. For the worker,
1As in models of dynamic monopoly pricing, the ﬁrm would prefer to commit to bid a ﬁxed wage for all
circumstances, provided other bidders committed as well. Of course, as with the Coase Conjecture, this strategy is
not subgame perfect. Two bidders without a commitment to a single bid will not in equilibrium maintain monopoly
oﬀers.
2Unlike the text book Bertrand outcome, in this environment wages from auctions with competing bidders are
less than marginal productivity. Because worker-ﬁrm contacts can die oﬀ, ﬁrms in a multiple bidder auction might
at some time in the future become the lone contact at which point they acquire some monopsony power. Given
this potential future payoﬀ, ﬁrms in the auction will hold back to some extent and not concede all productivity to
the worker. They prefer waiting over bidding up to marginal product. In this way they obtain some of the gains
to trade. See Taylor (1995) for a related result.
3The proposed mechanism also applies outside the labor market setting into other markets with matching
frictions, for example housing and durable goods where other resolutions of Diamond’s paradox, for example on-
the-job search or bargaining may not be appropriate.
1the value of attached search is a distinctly better position for the worker than unattached search.
The outcome of the wage auction relies on ﬁrms observing other bidders. Firms must know or
at least believe there is a positive probability that other bidders are involved at some point. We
therefore study two diﬀerent cases. Sections 2 through 4 characterize the equilibrium of the labor
market under the assumption that the number of ﬁrms that are bidding for a worker is public
information. This speciﬁcation seems to be appropriate for some labor markets. Academics,
lawyers, and other professionals come to mind. Public information might not be plausible in
other labor markets such as the market for clerical work. To address this possibility, Section
5 characterizes an equilibrium assuming that the number of bidders involved in an auction is
private information of the worker.
Recognizing other bidders in the auction is critical. When a ﬁrm meets a worker, the ﬁrm
must form beliefs about how many other bidders are involved in the auction. Knowing that in
the equilibrium with private information all workers accept the ﬁrst oﬀer that they receive, a
ﬁrm rationally believes itself to be the sole bidder when it meets a worker for the ﬁrst time.
The ﬁrm oﬀers the worker’s reservation wage. Oﬀ the equilibrium path, when a ﬁrm meets a
worker for the second time, it knows that any other bidder involved in the auction believes itself
to be a monopsonist. Therefore, the ﬁrm again ﬁnds it optimal to oﬀer the worker’s reservation
wage. The worker always receives his reservation wage, hence every employed worker earns the
monopsony wage no matter how small the search frictions are. If employers cannot verify the
number of other bidders in an auction, the equilibrium with recall is the same as the equilibrium
without recall.
The model here with recall can be related to the wage posting models of Butters (1977),
Burdett and Judd (1983), and Burdett and Mortensen (1998). Those models, which can be
interpreted as having auctions for workers with an unknown number of bidders, generate non-
degenerate wage distributions in equilibrium. In this paper, dispersion does not arise without on-
the-job search but like these other models, equilibrium wages depend critically on the expectation
of the number of bidders found during the search process. These expectations depend on the
observability of the worker’s options. With observable recall, the worker can veriﬁably increase
the number of bidders from one to two and thereby extract some match rents. With unobservable




A continuum of workers with measure one populate a labor market that operates in continuous
time. Each worker is endowed with one unit of labor per unit of time, maximizes the expected
sum of lifetime consumption, and leaves the labor market at the Poisson rate r>0. The reader
may interpret r as the rate at which workers retire, or as the rate at which workers die. The
measure of workers who participate in the labor market is constant over time because, per every
u n i to ft i m eo fl e n g t hdt, a continuum of workers with measure rdt enter the labor market. A
continuum of ﬁrms with positive measure also populates the labor market. Each ﬁrm operates
a constant return to scale technology that transforms one unit of labor into x units of output.
Each ﬁrm maximizes the expected sum of its proﬁts.
At any point in time, employment status and networking status characterize a worker. The
worker’s employment status is either unemployed or employed at the wage w.T h e w o r k e r ’ s
networking status is an integer between 0 and N which represents the number of ﬁrms that are
in contact with the worker. The upper bound N is the largest number of ﬁrms with which the
worker can have a long-distance relationship. It is important to note that N does not include
the current employer nor any ﬁrm that the worker might have just met. Most of the existing
literature implicitly assumes that N = 0 (e.g. Diamond, 1971; Mortensen, 1971; Mortensen and
Pissarides, 1999a,b; Burdett and Mortensen, 1998).
Consider an unemployed worker with i (distant) contacts, i =0 ,1,...,N. During unemploy-
ment, the worker consumes z>0 units of output per unit of time. The reader may interpret z
as the consumption equivalent of leisure, or as an unemployment beneﬁt. At the Poisson rate of
iφ, φ ≥ 0, the worker loses one of these contacts. At the Poisson rate of λ>0, the worker meets
a ﬁrm. When this happens, the worker receives a take-it-or-leave-it wage oﬀe rf r o mt h ej u s tm e t
ﬁrm, as well as from every one of the ﬁrms that are still in contact with the worker. If the worker
accepts one of these i +1o ﬀers, the worker becomes employed. If the worker rejects all of these
oﬀers, the worker adds the just met ﬁrm to the list of contacts and keeps on searching.
Consider next an employed worker with i contacts, excluding the current employer, i =
0,1,...,N. While employed, the worker produces x>zunits of output and consumes w units of
output per unit of time, where w is the worker’s wage rate. At the Poisson rate of iφ,t h ew o r k e r
loses one of these contacts. At the Poisson rate of δ ≥ 0, the worker is exogenously displaced
from the current job. When this happens, the worker receives a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer from every
one of the ﬁrms that are still in contact. If the worker accepts one of these i oﬀers, the worker
3moves from one employer to the other without an intervening spell of unemployment. If the
worker rejects all of these oﬀers (or if the worker did not have any contacts), the worker becomes
unemployed.
2.2. The Problem of the Worker
Let σf =( w1,w 2,...,w N+1)d e n o t et h es t r a t e g yo faﬁrm. The i-th element of σf denotes the
ﬁr m ’ sb i di na na u c t i o ni nw h i c ht h e r ea r ei bidders. Let Ui denote the lifetime utility of a worker
who is unemployed and has i contacts, i =0 ,1,...,N.L e tEi(w) denote the lifetime utility of a
worker who is employed at the wage w and has i contacts, i =0 ,1,...,N.Let Mi denote the value
to the ﬁrm of participating in an auction with i bidders, i =1 ,2,...,N+1 . Let Cu
i denote the
value to the ﬁrm of being in contact with an unemployed worker who has i − 1 other contacts,
i =1 ,2,...,N. Similarly, let Ce
i denote the value to the ﬁrm of being in contact with an employed
worker who is in contact with i−1o t h e rﬁrms, i =1 ,2,...,N. Finally, let Ji(w)d e n o t et h ev a l u e
to a ﬁrm from employing a worker who has i contacts, i =0 ,1,...,N.
A worker employed at the wage w who has i contacts, i =0 ,1,...,N,receives ﬂow utility equal
to the wage w.A tr a t eδ, the worker is displaced from the current job. In this case, the worker
receives the oﬀer wi from every one of the contacts. If the worker accepts one of these oﬀers, he
remains employed but the wage goes from w to wi. If the worker rejects all of these oﬀers, he
becomes unemployed with i contacts. At rate iφ, the worker loses one of these contacts. In this
case, the worker remains employed at the wage w, but has only i−1 contacts left. Therefore, the
worker’s lifetime utility Ei(w)i sg i v e nb y
rEi(w)=w + δ [max{Ei−1(wi),U i} − Ei(w)] + iφ[Ei−1(w) − Ei(w)]. (2.1)
From equation (2.1) for i = 0, it follows that the value function E0(w) is strictly increasing
with respect to w. In turn, from equation (2.1) for i =1 ,2,...,N and from the monotonicity of
Ei−1(w), it follows that the value function Ei(w) is strictly increasing with respect to w.
An unemployed worker who has i contacts, i =0 ,1,...,N, receives the ﬂow utility z.A t
rate iφ, the worker loses one of these contacts. In this case, the worker remains unemployed
and continues searching with i − 1 contacts. At rate λ, the worker meets a ﬁrm. In this case,
the worker receives the wage oﬀer wi+1 from the just met ﬁrm as well as from every one of the
i contacts. If the worker accepts one of these oﬀers, he becomes employed at the wage wi+1.
If the worker rejects all of these oﬀers, he remains unemployed and continues searching with
4max{i +1 ,N} contacts. Therefore, the worker’s lifetime utility Ui is given by
rUi = z + λ[max{Ei(wi+1),U i+1} − Ui]+iφ[Ui−1 − Ui], if i<N,
rUi = z + λ[max{Ei(wi+1),U i} − Ui]+iφ[Ui−1 − Ui]i f i = N.
(2.2)
Remember that Ei(w)i ss t r i c t l yi n c r e a s i n gi nw. Therefore, equation (2.2) implies that the
worker’s acceptance strategy in an auction with i+1 bidders has the reservation property. That
is, the worker accepts the oﬀer wi+1 if and only if it is greater than the reservation wage Ri+1,
where Ri+1 is such that Ei(Ri+1)=Ui+1 for i<N ,a n dEi(Ri+1)=Ui for i = N. The vector
σw =( R1,R 2,...,R N+1) describes the strategy of the worker.
2.3. The Problem of the Firm
Consider ﬁrst a ﬁrm that enters an auction as the sole bidder and oﬀers the worker the wage w.
If w is weakly greater than the reservation wage R1, the worker accepts the oﬀer. In this case,
the value to the ﬁrm from hiring the worker is J0(w). If w is strictly smaller than the reservation
wage R1, the worker rejects the oﬀer and continues searching. In this case, the value of the worker
to the ﬁrm is Cu
1. Therefore, the value to the ﬁrm of entering an auction as the sole bidder is
M1 = Cu
1 +m a x
w {1(w ≥ R1)(J0(w) − Cu
1)}. (2.3)
where 1(w ≥ R1) is an indicator function that takes the value of one if w ≥ R1 and zero otherwise.
Consider next a ﬁrm that enters into an auction with i bidders, i =2 ,3,...,N+1 , and oﬀers
the wage w to the worker. Every one of the other bidders oﬀers the wage wi. Suppose that
wi ≥ Ri.I fw is strictly greater than wi, the worker accepts the oﬀer of the ﬁrm. In this case,
the value of the worker to the ﬁrm is Ji−1(w). If w equals wi, the worker accepts the oﬀer of
the ﬁrm with probability 1/i and accepts the oﬀer of one of the other bidders with probability
(1−i)/i. In this case the value of the worker to the ﬁrm is Ji−1(w)/i+(i−1)Ce
i−1/i. Finally, if w
is strictly smaller than wi, the worker rejects the oﬀer of the ﬁrm. In this last case, the value of
the worker to the ﬁrm is Ce
i−1.T h e r e f o r e ,i fwi ≥ Ri, the value to the ﬁrm of entering an auction
with i bidders is
Mi = Ce
i−1 +m a x
w
©






Now, suppose that wi <R i.I fw is weakly greater than Ri, the worker accepts the oﬀer of the
ﬁrm. In this case, the value of the worker to the ﬁrm is Ji−1(w). If w is strictly smaller than Ri,
the worker rejects the oﬀer of the ﬁrm. In this case the value of the worker to the ﬁrm is Cu
i if
5i<N+1andCu
i−1(i−1)/i if i = N +1. Therefore, if wi <R i, the value to the ﬁrm of entering
an auction with i bidders contacts is
Mi = Cu
i +m a x
w {1(w ≥ Ri)(Ji−1(w) − Cu
i )},i f i<N+1 ,
Mi = Cu








, if i = N +1 .
(2.5)
Now, consider a ﬁrm that employs a worker with i contacts, i =0 ,1,...,N.T h eﬁrm receives
the ﬂow proﬁt x − w.A tr a t eδ, the worker is displaced from the ﬁrm. In this case, the value of
the worker to the ﬁrm is zero. At rate iφ, the worker loses one of the contacts. In this case, the
value of the worker to the ﬁrm is Ji−1(w). Therefore, the value to the ﬁrm of employing a worker
with i contacts is
rJi(w)=x − w − δJi(w)+iφ[Ji−1(w) − Ji(w)]. (2.6)
From equation (2.6) for i = 0, it follows that the value function J0(w) is strictly decreasing with
respect to w. In turn, from equation (2.6) for i =1 ,2,...,Nand from the monotonicity of Ji−1(w),
it follows that the value function Ji(w) is strictly decreasing with respect to w.
Finally, the value to the ﬁrm of being in contact with a worker who has i − 1 other contacts,
i =1 ,2,...,N, is such that
rCu
i = λ(Mi+1 − Cu
i ) − φCu




i = δ(Mi − Ce
i ) − φCe








The previous paragraphs motivate the following deﬁnition of equilibrium.
Definition 1: A Symmetric Equilibrium is an acceptance strategy of the worker, σw =( R1,...,R N+1),
and a bidding strategy of the ﬁrm, σf =( w1,...w N+1), such that: (i) For i =0 ,1,...,N − 1,
Ei(Ri+1)=Ui+1,a n dEN(RN+1)=UN; (ii) For i =2 ,3,...,N +1and wi ≥ Ri, wi is the
solution to the maximization problem (2.4); for i =2 ,3,...,N+1and wi <R i, wi is the solution
to the maximization problem (2.5); and w1 is the solution to the maximization problem (2.3).
3. Characterizing the δ>0 Case
It is useful to break down the characterization of equilibrium into two distinct cases determined
by the job destruction rate δ.T h eﬁrst case, in which the job destruction rate δ is strictly positive,
is more challenging. We provide a complete characterization of equilibrium only for N =1a n d
6establish some general properties of equilibrium for N ≥ 2. The second case, in which the job
destruction rate δ equals zero, is easier. We fully characterize the equilibrium for any N ≥ 1.
This section focuses on the ﬁrst case. The next section studies the second case.
3.1. Indiﬀerence of the Firm
Let N = 1 and suppose wi ≥ Ri,i=1 , 2. The value to the ﬁrm from meeting a worker without
any contacts is
M1 = Cu
1 +m a x
w {1(w ≥ R1)(J0(w) − Cu
1)}. (3.1)
If J0(R1) <C u
1, the solution to the maximization problem in (3.1) is a wage oﬀer, w1,t h a ti s
strictly smaller than the worker’s reservation wage, R1.I f J0(R1) ≥ Cu
1, the solution to the
maximization problem in (3.1) is a wage oﬀer, w1, that equals the worker’s reservation wage,
R1. From these observations, it follows that the conjecture w1 ≥ R1 is satisﬁed if and only
if J0(R1) ≥ Cu
1. Moreover, whenever the conjecture w1 ≥ R1 is satisﬁed, w1 = R1.T h a t i s ,
the outcome of an auction with one bidder is a wage that makes the worker indiﬀerent between
accepting and rejecting the job.
Given the conjecture w2 ≥ R2, the value to the ﬁrm of entering an auction with two bidders
is
M2 = Ce
1 +m a x
w {[1(w>w 2)+1 ( w = w2)/2](J1(w) − Ce
1)}. (3.2)
If J1(w2) >C e
1, the solution to the maximization problem in (3.2) is a wage oﬀer strictly greater
than w2.I fJ1(w2) <C e
1, the solution is a wage oﬀer strictly less than w2.I fJ1(w2)=Ce
1,t h e
solution is any wage oﬀer less than or equal to w2. In a Symmetric Equilibrium, the wage oﬀer
that solves the maximization problem (3.2) of one bidder equals the wage oﬀer of the other bidder,
w2. Hence, in a Symmetric Equilibrium, J1(w2)=Ce
1 : the outcome of an auction between two
ﬁrms is a wage that makes the ﬁrms indiﬀerent between hiring and not hiring the worker. It
is important to notice that the value to the ﬁrm of not hiring the worker need not equal zero
because, with some probability, the worker will lose his job and contact the ﬁrm again.
From equation (2.4) and the equilibrium condition J1(w2)=Ce
1, it follows that the value to
the ﬁrm of participating in an auction with two bidders equals the value of being in contact with
an employed worker, i.e. M2 = Ce
1. It then follows from equation (2.7) and M2 = Ce
1 that the




r + λ + φ
Ce
1. (3.3)
7From equation (2.3) and the conjecture that w1 ≥ R1, it follows that the value to the ﬁrm
from participating in an auction as the sole bidder is M1 = J0(w1). In turn, from equation (2.8)





r + δ + φ
M1 =
δ (x − w1)
(r + δ + φ)(r + δ)
, (3.4)
where the second equality uses the fact that M1 = J0(w1)a n dJ0(w1)=( x − w1)/(r + δ).
Using (3.4) and the result that J1(w2)=( x − w2)/(r + δ), we can rewrite the equilibrium
condition Ce
1 = J1(w2)a s
w2 =
r + φ
r + δ + φ
x +
δ
r + δ + φ
w1. (3.5)
Condition (3.5) describes the wage w2 that makes a ﬁrm indiﬀerent between hiring and not hiring
a worker in an auction with two bidders. Equation (3.5) implies that the wage w2 is a weighted
average of the productivity of an employed worker, x, and the equilibrium wage oﬀered to a
worker without other contacts, w1.T h ew e i g h t so nx and w1 are both positive. The weight on x
is positive because the value of hiring the worker is increasing in x.T h ew e i g h to nw1 is positive
because the value of not hiring the worker (and waiting for a job displacement and a subsequent
wage of w1)i sd e c r e a s i n gi nw1. Naturally, the rate, φ, at which a worker loses touch with a ﬁrm
reduces the weight on w1.T h er a t eδ at which an employed worker loses the current job reduces
the weight on x. In Figure 1, the green line represents the wages (w1,w2)t h a ts a t i s f yt h eﬁrm’s
indiﬀerence condition (3.5).
3.2. Indiﬀerence of the Worker
An unemployed worker who enters an auction with one bidder receives a wage oﬀer that makes him
indiﬀerent between accepting (and becoming employed) and rejecting (and staying unemployed),
i.e. E0(w1)=U1. Given this equilibrium property and equation (2.2), the lifetime utility of an










The value to the worker of being unemployed without a contact equals a weighted average of the
present value of leisure, z/r, and the value of being unemployed with one contact, U1.T h er a t e ,
λ, at which a worker meets a ﬁrm decreases the weight on z/r and increases the weight on U1.
An unemployed worker who enters an auction with two bidders receives a wage oﬀer, w2, that
is greater than R2, according to our initial conjecture. Given this oﬀer and equation (2.2), we
8ﬁnd that the lifetime utility of an unemployed worker with one contact is
U1 =
r





r + λ + φ
U0 +
λ
r + λ + φ
E1(w2). (3.7)
The value to the worker of being unemployed with one contact equals a weighted average between
t h ep r e s e n tv a l u eo fl e i s u r e ,z/r, the value of being unemployed with no contacts, U0,a n dt h e
value of being employed with one contact at the wage w2. The rate, φ, at which a worker loses
touch with a ﬁrm increases the weight on U0 and decreases the weight on z/r and E1(w2). The
rate, λ, at which a worker meets a ﬁrm increases the weight on E1(w2) and decreases the weight
on z/r and U0. Taken together, equations (3.7) and (3.6) identify two necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for the value of unemployment to be greater than the present value of leisure. The
ﬁrst condition is that the probability that the worker ﬁnds himself in an auction with two bidders
is positive, i.e. the rate, φ, at which a worker loses a long-distance contact is ﬁnite. The second
condition is that, when the worker ﬁnds himself in an auction with two bidders, he extracts some
of the gains from trade, i.e. E1(w2) >U 1.











The value to the worker of being employed at the wage w is the weighted average of the present
value of the wage, w/r, and the value of being unemployed without contacts, U0.T h er a t e ,δ,a t
which a worker loses his job decreases the weight on w/r and increases the weight on U0.
Using equation (3.8) and (2.1), we further ﬁnd that the lifetime utility of a worker who is











r + δ + φ
U0 +
r + δ




The value to the worker of being employed at a job that pays the wage w2 is a weighted average
of the present value of the wage w2, and of the value to the worker of losing the job (the term
in square brackets). The weight on the present value of the wage is decreasing in δ.T h ev a l u e
to the worker of losing the job is a weighted average of the value of being unemployed with no
contacts, U0, and the value of being unemployed with one contact, U1. Taken together, equations
(3.9) and (3.6) imply that E1(w2) >U 1 if and only if w2 >z .
Solving the system of equations (3.6)-(3.9) for the values U0, U1, E0(w1)a n dE1(w2)g i v e s
the equilibrium condition U1 = E0(w1)a s
w1 = z + α(w2 − z), (3.10)
9where α is given by
α =
λ(r + δ + φ)(r + δ + λ)
(r + δ)(r + φ + λ)(r + δ + φ + λ)+λ2φ
.
In Figure 1, the red line represents the wages (w1,w2) that satisfy the worker’s indiﬀerence condi-
tion (3.10). Condition (3.10) describes the wage w1 that a ﬁrm needs to oﬀer to an unemployed
worker who does not have any other contact in order to make the worker indiﬀerent between
becoming employed and waiting for a second bidder. Notice that condition (3.10) implies a pos-
itive (and linear) relationship between w1 and w2,i . e .α>0. Intuitively, a higher w2 increases
the value to the worker from waiting for a second bidder and thereby raises the wage w1 that
makes him indiﬀerent between waiting and becoming employed. Also notice that w1 increases
less than one-for-one with w2,i . e .α<1. Due to time discounting, equal increases in w2 and w1
lead to a larger impact on the worker’s value of becoming employed than on the worker’s value of
remaining unemployed. Finally, notice that w1 is greater than z if and only if φ is ﬁnite and w2 is
greater than z. The intuition for this property follows from the discussion above of the worker’s
value functions.
3.3. Equilibrium Outcomes
The solution to equilibrium conditions (3.5) and (3.10) is given by
w1 =
(1 − α)(r + φ + δ)
r + φ +( 1− α)δ
z +
α(r + φ)




r + φ +( 1− α)δ
z +
r + φ
r + φ +( 1− α)δ
x.
(3.11)
The wage, w1,o ﬀered by a ﬁrm to an unemployed worker without contacts is greater than the
monopsony wage, z, and smaller than the wage, w2,o ﬀered by a ﬁrm to an unemployed worker
with another contact. The wage w2 is smaller than the competitive wage, x. When the rate, λ,
at which workers meet ﬁr m sg o e st oi n ﬁnity, the wages w1 and w2 converge to the competitive
wage, x. When the rate, φ, at which workers lose contact with ﬁr m sg o e st oi n ﬁnity, the wages
w1 and w2 converge to the monopsony wage, z.
These ﬁndings are noteworthy and deserve further discussion. First, notice that a ﬁrm is
willing to oﬀer a wage w1 greater than the monopsony wage z to an unemployed worker without
any contacts. Intuitively, even though the worker currently is not in contact with any other ﬁrm,
the worker has the option to keep on searching and meet another ﬁrm. Because of this option,
the ﬁrm faces (in a probabilistic sense) some competition for the worker and is willing to oﬀer a
wage greater than the monopsony wage. Second, notice that a ﬁrm oﬀers strictly less than the
competitive wage to a worker who has a contact with another ﬁrm. Intuitively, the ﬁrm that loses
10the auction has some positive probability of later on meeting the worker in a position of partial
monopsony. Therefore, the wage that makes the ﬁrm indiﬀerent between winning and losing the
auction is lower than the competitive wage. In light of these arguments, it is straightforward
to understand why w1 and w2 converge to the competitive wage when the meeting rate goes to
inﬁnity, and why w1 and w2 converge to the monopsony wage when the contact loss rate goes to
inﬁnity.
To complete the characterization of equilibrium, note that the worker’s reservation wage in
an auction with one bidder, R1, is the unique solution for w to the equation E0(w)=U1.S i n c e
the equilibrium wage w1 is such that E0(w1)=U1,i tf o l l o w st h a tR1 equals w1.T h e w o r k e r ’ s
reservation wage in an auction with two bidders, R2, is the unique solution for w to the equation
E1(w)=U1. Having characterized the strategy of the ﬁrms, (w1,w 2), and the strategy of the
workers, (R1,R 2), we can characterize the equilibrium behavior of the economy. Since w1 is
equal to R1, an unemployed worker becomes employed as soon as he meets a ﬁrm, and remains
employed until his job is exogenously destroyed. Since all workers accept the ﬁrst oﬀer they
receive, all employed workers earn a wage of w1.
Finally, given the equilibrium strategies (w1,w 2)a n d( R1,R 2), we can compute the values
of the ﬁrms using the equilibrium conditions (3.1) — (3.4), as well as the values of the workers
using the equilibrium conditions (3.6) — (3.9). Given these values it is straightforward to verify
that the worker’s reservation wage in an auction with two bidders, R2, is smaller than the wage
oﬀer w2. It is also straightforward to verify that the value to the ﬁrm of hiring an unemployed
worker at the reservation wage R1 is greater than the value of being in contact with him, i.e.
J0(R1) >C u
1.T h e s e ﬁndings prove that the conjectures made at the beginning of the sections
are satisﬁed. Hence, the strategies (w1,w 2)a n d( R1,R 2), constitute a Symmetric Equilibrium of
the model.
Theorem 1 summarizes these ﬁndings and rules out the existence of other equilibria.
Theorem 1: Let δ>0.F o r N =1 , there exists a unique Symmetric Equilibrium. (i) The
equilibrium strategy of the ﬁrm is given by the wage oﬀers (w1,w 2),w h e r ew1 <w 2.( i i ) T h e
equilibrium wages w1 and w2 are strictly greater than the monopsony wage, z, and strictly smaller
than the competitive wage, x. Moreover, w1 → z and w2 → z as φ →∞ ;a n dw1 → x and w2 → x
as λ →∞ . (iii) The equilibrium strategy of the worker is given by the reservation wages (R1,R 2),
where R1 = w1 and R2 <w 2. (iv) All employed workers accept the ﬁrst oﬀer they receive and
earn the wage w1.
Proof: In Appendix. ¥
113.4. Equilibrium Properties for N ≥ 2
The above exposition provides a complete characterization of equilibrium for N =1 . F o rt h e
N ≥ 2 case, it is substantially harder to solve the system of equations that implicitly deﬁne the
worker’s reservation wages and the ﬁrm’s optimal bids. Suppose N ≥ 2. If w1 ≥ R1 and w2 ≥ R2,
the equilibrium wages are the same as in the N = 1. However, verifying the conjecture that
w2 ≥ R2, requires computing w3, which in turn requires verifying conjectures about the sign of
the diﬀerence wi − Ri, i ≥ 3. This latter process becomes algebraically cumbersome as one has
to solve the diﬀerence equations describing Ui and Ei(w).
Despite these obstacles, we can still establish that in any equilibrium with N ≥ 2, the worker’s
expected value of unemployment is above z/r and workers receive some wage oﬀers that are strictly
greater than the monopsony wage. The Diamond outcome, where ﬁrms extract the entire gains
to trade, is not an equilibrium allocation when workers recall past contacts and ﬁrms observe the
number of bidders in the auction.
Theorem 2: Let δ>0.F o rN ≥ 2, any Symmetric Equilibrium has the following properties: (i)
The lifetime utility of an unemployed worker is greater than the present value of leisure, Ui >z / r
for i =0 ,1,...,N. (ii) There is a wage oﬀer that is greater than the monopsony wage, wi >zfor
some i =1 ,2,...,N+1 .
Proof: In Appendix. ¥
124. Characterizing the δ =0Case
The previous section characterized equilibrium under the assumption that the job destruction
rate is strictly positive. This section characterizes equilibrium under the simpler alternative that
the job destruction rate equals zero.
4.1. Indiﬀerence of the Firm
Let N ≥ 1 and suppose wi ≥ Ri, i =1 ,2,...,N+ 1. The value to the ﬁrm of entering an auction
as the sole bidder is
M1 = Cu
1 +m a x
w {1(w ≥ R1)(J0(w) − Cu
1)}. (4.1)
If J0(R1) <C u
1, the solution to the maximization problem in (4.1) is a wage oﬀer, w1,t h a ti s
strictly smaller than the worker’s reservation wage, R1.I f J0(R1) ≥ Cu
1, the solution to the
maximization problem in (4.1) is a wage oﬀer, w1, that equals the worker’s reservation wage, R1.
These observations imply that, in any equilibrium such that w1 ≥ R1, w1 = R1. The outcome of
an auction with one bidder is a wage that makes the worker indiﬀerent between accepting and
rejecting the job.
The value to the ﬁrm of entering an auction with multiple bidders is
Mi = Ce
i−1 +m a x
w
©






If Ji−1(wi) >C e
i−1, the solution to the maximization problem in (4.2) is a wage oﬀer strictly
greater than wi.I f Ji−1(wi) <C e
i−1, the solution is a wage oﬀer strictly smaller than wi.I f
Ji−1(wi)=Ce
i−1, the solution is any wage oﬀe rs m a l l e ro re q u a lt owi. In equilibrium, the wage
oﬀer that solves the maximization problem (3.2) of one bidder equals the wage oﬀer of the other
bidders, wi. Hence, in equilibrium, Ji−1(wi)=Ce
i−1. The outcome of an auction with multiple
bidders is a wage that makes the ﬁrms indiﬀerent between hiring and not hiring the worker.
Using equation (2.8), it can be shown that the value to the ﬁrm from being in contact with
an employed worker equals zero, Ce
i =0f o ri =1 ,2,...,N. This result is intuitive. Since the
job destruction rate δ is zero, a worker will never look for another job once employed. The ﬁrm
receives no payoﬀ in the future from being in contact with an employed worker.
Using equation (2.4) and the equilibrium condition Ji−1(wi)=Ce
i−1, it can be further shown
that the value to the ﬁrm from entering an auction with multiple bidders equals zero, i.e. Mi =0
for i =2 ,3,...,N + 1. This result is likewise intuitive. In an equilibrium of an auction with
multiple bidders, every ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between hiring and not hiring the worker. Since there
13is no beneﬁt from waiting and not hiring the worker, the ﬁrm again receives zero payoﬀ from
participating in an auction with multiple bidders.
Using equation (2.7) it can also be shown that the value to the ﬁrm from being in contact
with an unemployed worker equals zero, Cu
i =0f o ri =1 ,2,...,N. Intuitively, an unemployed
worker recalls an old bidder only after meeting a new one. Since the ﬁrm receives zero beneﬁt
from participating in an auction with multiple bidders, there is no payoﬀ from being in contact
with an unemployed worker.
From equation (2.6), it follows that the value to the ﬁrm from employing a worker at the wage
w is Ji(w)=( x − w)/r. From the discussion in the above paragraph, the value to the ﬁrm from
being in contact with an employed worker is Ce
i =0 . H e n c e ,t h eﬁrm’s indiﬀerence condition
Ji−1(wi)=Ce
i−1 implies that wi = x for i =2 ,3,...,N+ 1. This result is again intuitive. The
outcome of an auction with multiple bidders is a wage that makes all ﬁrms indiﬀerent between
hiring and not hiring the worker. Since the value of not hiring the worker is zero, the outcome of
an auction with multiple bidders is a wage that exhausts the output of the match.
4.2. Indiﬀerence of the Worker
An unemployed worker who enters an auction with one bidder receives a wage oﬀer that makes
him indiﬀerent between employment and unemployment, i.e. E0(w1)=U1. In contrast, an
unemployed worker who enters an auction with multiple bidders receives a wage oﬀer that exhausts
the output of the match, i.e. wi = x for i =2 ,3,...,N+1. Using these observations and equations
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The ﬁrst line in (4.3) states that the value to the worker of being unemployed without a contact
is a weighted average of the present value of leisure, z/r, and the value of being unemployed with
one contact, U1. The second line states that the value to the worker of being unemployed with
i ≥ 1 contacts is a weighted average of the present value of leisure, z/r, the value of being
unemployed with i − 1 contacts, Ui−1, and the value of being employed at the wage x.T h el a s t
line in (4.3) states that the value to the worker of being employed at the wage w is equal to the
present value of the wage, w/r.
14Using (4.3), it can be shown that the worker’s indiﬀerence condition U1 = E1(w1)i m p l i e s
w1 = z +
λ(r + φ)(r + λ)
r(r + φ + λ)2 + λ2φ
(x − z). (4.4)
The wage, w1, which is the outcome of an auction with only one bidder, is strictly greater than
the monopsony wage, z, and strictly smaller than the competitive wage, x. It is also increasing
with respect to the rate, λ, at which workers meet ﬁrms and converges to x as λ goes to inﬁnity.
It is decreasing with respect to the rate, φ, at which workers lose contacts and it converges to z
as φ goes to inﬁnity. The reasoning behind these results is the same as for the case of δ>0.
We stress that the wage w1 does not depend on the number of contacts N that the worker
can keep. When δ =0 ,t h eﬁrm gets no value from being in contact with an employed worker.
Without a payoﬀ down the road from staying in contact with an employed worker, two bidders
are enough to drive the wage up to its competitive value.
To summarize, the equilibrium strategy of the ﬁrm is σf =( w1,w 2,...,w N+1), where w1
equals the right hand side of (4.4) and w2,w 3,...,w N+1 all equal x. The equilibrium strategy of
the worker is σw =( R1,R 2,...,R N+1), where R1 equals w1,a n dRi equals the solution to the
indiﬀerence condition Ei−1(wi)=Ui for i =2 ,3,...,N+1 . S i n c ew1 = R1, every worker accepts
the ﬁrst oﬀer received and all employed workers earn the wage w1. Finally, it is straightforward to
verify the conjecture wi ≥ Ri for i =1 ,2,...,N+1. Therefore, the strategies (σw,σ f)c o n s t i t u t ea
Symmetric Equilibrium. It is also straightforward to verify that there are no Symmetric Equilibria
for which the condition wi ≥ Ri does not hold.
Theorem 3 summarizes these ﬁndings.
Theorem 3: Let δ =0 . For all N ≥ 1, there exists a unique Symmetric Equilibrium. (i) The
equilibrium strategy of the ﬁrm is given by the wage oﬀers (w1,w 2,...,w N+1),w h e r ew1 <w 2 =
...wN+1. (ii) The equilibrium wage w1 is strictly greater than the monopsony wage, z, and strictly
smaller than the competitive wage, x.M o r e o v e r ,w1 → z as φ →∞ ;a n dw1 → x as λ →∞ . (iii)
The equilibrium wages w2,w 3,...,w N+1 are equal to the competitive wage x.( i v )T h ee q u i l i b r i u m
strategy of the worker is given by the reservation wages (R1,R 2,...,R N+1),w h e r eR1 = w1 and
Ri <w i for i =2 ,3,...,N +1 . (v) All employed workers accept the ﬁrst oﬀer they receive and
earn the wage w1.
5. Asymmetric Information
Sections 3 and 4 characterized the labor market equilibrium under the assumption that ﬁrms
can perfectly observe the number of bidders participating in the auction for a worker. This
15assumption is reasonable for some labor markets, but not for all. For instance, this assumption is
probably reasonable for academics, but not for clerks. For this reason, this section characterizes
an equilibrium under the alternative assumption that ﬁrms cannot observe the number of bidders
who participate in a labor auction. For ease of exposition the analysis assumes that a worker can
keep at most one long-distance contact, i.e. N = 1, and that the exogenous job destruction rate
equals zero, i.e. δ =0 .
5.1. Strategies
Let σw =( R1,R 2,ϕ) be the strategy of a worker where R1 denotes the worker’s reservation
wage in an auction with one bidder; R2 denotes the worker’s reservation wage in an auction with
two bidders; and ϕ denotes the Poisson rate at which an unemployed worker with one contact
calls for an auction before meeting a second ﬁrm. In general, the worker’s reservation strategy
could depend on the entire history of the relationship with a bidder, e.g., the previous oﬀers
that the worker received from that bidder along with the time that has elapsed between any two
auctions. Here, we restrict attention to simple equilibria in which the worker’s reservation wages
only depend on the number of bidders.
Let σf =( wn,w r) be the strategy of a ﬁrm where wn denotes the ﬁr m ’ sb i di na na u c t i o nf o r
a worker that the ﬁrm has never met before whereas the second element wr denotes the ﬁrm’s bid
in an auction for a worker that the ﬁrm has met and recalled from the past. Like the worker’s
strategy, the ﬁrm’s bidding strategy could depend on the entire history of its relationship with
the worker. Again, we restrict attention to simple ﬁrm strategies with bids that depend only on
whether or not the ﬁrm met the worker before.
Finally, let π =( πn,π r)d e n o t et h eb e l i e f so ft h eﬁrm. In particular, in an auction for a worker
that it has never met before, the ﬁrm believes that there is another bidder with probability πn,
and that there is not another bidder with probability 1 − πn. In an auction for a worker that it
has met in the past, the ﬁrm believes that there is another bidder with probability πr,a n dt h a t
there is not another bidder with probability 1 − πr. The strategies σw and σf together with the
beliefs π constitute a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium under the following conditions:
Definition 2: The strategies σw and σf and the beliefs π constitute a Perfect Bayesian Equilib-
rium if: (i) σw is the worker’s optimal strategy, given that the ﬁrm’s strategy is σf; (ii) σf is the
ﬁrm’s optimal strategy, given that the workers’ strategy is σw and the ﬁrm’s beliefs are π; (iii) π
is derived from the strategies σw and σf through Bayes’ rule (whenever possible).
165.2. Existence
Let the strategy of the worker be σw =( R∗
1,R ∗
2,ϕ ∗)=( z,z,0). In an auction with one bidder,
the worker accepts any wage oﬀer greater than the value of leisure, z.I n a n a u c t i o n w i t h t w o
bidders, the worker accepts the highest wage oﬀe r ,a sl o n ga si ti sg r e a t e rt h a nz.I ft h et w oo ﬀers
are identical and acceptable, assume that the worker accepts the oﬀer of the ﬁrm that was met
ﬁrst, i.e. the recalled ﬁrm.
Let the strategy of the ﬁrm be σf =( w∗
n,w∗
r)=( z,z). The ﬁrm bids z both in an auction for
a worker that it has never met before and in an auction for a worker that it has previously met.
Let the ﬁrm’s beliefs be π =( π∗
n,π∗
r)=( 0 ,1). In an auction for a worker that it has never met
before, the ﬁrm believes itself to be the sole bidder. In an auction for a worker that it has met
in the past, the ﬁrm believes that there is a second bidder. In what follows, we establish that
the strategies (R∗
1,R ∗
2,ϕ ∗)a n d( w∗
n,w∗
r), and the beliefs (π∗
n,π∗
r)c o n s t i t u t eaP e r f e c tB a y e s i a n
Equilibrium.
To prove that σw =( R∗
1,R ∗
2,ϕ ∗)=( z,z,0) is an optimal strategy for the worker, consider
an unemployed worker who does not have any contacts. The worker receives the ﬂow utility
z.A t r a t e λ, the worker meets a ﬁrm for the ﬁr s tt i m ea n dr e c e i v e st h ew a g eo ﬀer w∗
n.I f t h e
worker accepts the oﬀer, the worker becomes employed. If the worker rejects the oﬀer, the worker
becomes unemployed with one contact. Therefore, the worker’s lifetime utility, U0,i sg i v e nb y
rU0 = z + λ[max{E1(w∗
n),U 1} − U0]. (5.1)
Consider next an unemployed worker with one contact. The worker has the option to recall
the contact and ask for an oﬀer. If the worker exercises this option and accepts the subsequent
oﬀer, the worker becomes employed at the wage w∗
r. If the worker does not exercise this option,
the worker receives the ﬂow utility z.A tr a t eλ, the worker meets a second ﬁrm and is oﬀered
the wage w∗
n by the just met ﬁrm and the wage w∗
r by the recalled ﬁrm. If the worker accepts
one of these oﬀers, the worker becomes employed. If the worker rejects these oﬀers, the worker
remains unemployed and continues searching with one contact. At rate φ,t h ew o r k e rl o s e st o u c h
with the contact. Therefore, the worker’s lifetime utility, U1, is such that
rU1 =m a x {rE1(w∗
r),z+ λ[max{E1(w∗
r),E 1(w∗
n),U 1} − U1]+φ[U0 − U1]}. (5.2)
Finally, consider a worker employed at the wage w who is in contact with i other ﬁrms,
i =0 ,1. Given the zero rate of job destruction, it follows immediately that the lifetime utility of
this worker equals the present value of the current wage, i.e. Ei(w)=w/r for i =0 ,1.
17From equations (5.1), (5.2) and w∗
r = w∗
n = z, it follows that the lifetime utility of an
unemployed worker equals the present value of leisure, i.e. U0 = U1 = z/r.F r o m E0(w)=
E1(w)=w/r and U1 = z/r, it then follows that (a) the reservation wage, R∗
1,o ft h ew o r k e ri na n
auction with one bidder is z; (b) the reservation wage, R∗
2, of the worker in an auction with two
bidders is z; (c) an unemployed worker with one contact does not call an auction before meeting
another ﬁrm. This establishes that (R∗
1,R ∗
2,ϕ ∗)=( z,z,0) is an optimal strategy of the worker.
To prove that σf =( w∗
n,w∗
r)=( z,z) is an optimal strategy for a ﬁrm, consider a potential
employer that enters an auction without observing the number of participating bidders. In an
auction for a worker that it has never met before, the ﬁrm believes that there is another bidder
with probability π∗
n, and that there is not a second bidder with probability 1 − π∗
n.S u p p o s et h e
ﬁrm oﬀers the wage w. If there happens to be a second bidder, the worker accepts w if this oﬀer
is weakly greater the reservation wage R∗
2 and strictly greater than the oﬀer of the second ﬁrm,
w∗
r. If the two bids are identical and above R∗
2, the worker breaks a tie in favor of the ﬁrst met
ﬁrm, i.e. the recalled bidder. If there is no second bidder, the worker accepts w as long as it is
greater than the reservation wage, R∗
1. Therefore, the value to the ﬁrm from entering an auction
for a newly met worker is













In an auction for a previously-met worker, the ﬁrm believes that there is a second bidder with
probability π∗
r, and that there is no other bidder with probability 1−π∗
r. Suppose the ﬁrm oﬀers
the wage w. If there happens to be a second bidder, the worker accepts w if it is weakly greater
than both the reservation wage R∗
2 and the oﬀer of the just met second ﬁrm, w∗
n. If there is only
one bidder, the worker accepts w as long as it is weakly greater than the reservation wage, R∗
1.
Therefore, the value to the ﬁrm from entering an auction for a previously-met worker is













Since job displacement does not occur, the value to the ﬁrm of employing a worker at the wage
w is J1(w)=( x − w)/r, i =0 ,1; the value to the ﬁrm of being in contact with an unemployed
worker is Cu
1 = λJ1(w∗




1 = z and w∗
r = z, it follows that J0(R∗
1) >C u
1.F r o m π∗
n =0a n dJ0(R∗
1) >C u
1,i t
then follows that the solution to the maximization problem in (5.3) is a wage oﬀer w∗
n that equals
18the value of leisure, z.F u r t h e r , f r o m R∗
2 = z and w∗
r = z, it follows that J1(R∗
2) >C e
1.F r o m
π∗
r =1a n dJ1(R∗
2) >C e
1, it follows that the solution to the maximization problem in (5.4) is
a wage oﬀer w∗
r that equals the value of leisure, z. This establishes that (w∗
n,w∗
r)=( z,z)i sa n
optimal strategy for the ﬁrm.
To ﬁnish the proof, we verify that the beliefs (π∗
n,π∗
r)=( 0 ,1) are derived from the equilibrium
strategies through Bayes’ rule (whenever possible). In equilibrium, every worker accepts the ﬁrst
oﬀer received. Hence, if a ﬁrm meets a worker for the ﬁrst time, the probability that this worker
is in contact with a second ﬁrm is zero. Second, in equilibrium, a worker accepts any oﬀer greater
than z. Hence, if a ﬁrm meets a worker for the n-th time, n =2 ,3,..., and one of its previous
oﬀers was greater than z, the probability that the worker is in contact with another ﬁrm is not
pinned down by Bayes’ rule. Third, in equilibrium, an unemployed worker with one contact does
not call for an auction until the worker meets another ﬁrm. Hence, if a ﬁrm meets a worker for
the n-th time and all of its previous oﬀers were smaller than z, the probability that the worker is
in contact with another ﬁrm is one. This establishes that the beliefs (π∗
n,π∗
r)=( 0 ,1) are derived
from the equilibrium strategies, and leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 4 (Recall with Asymmetric Information): Assume that ﬁrms cannot observe the num-
ber of bidders who participate in the auction for a worker. (i) The strategy of the ﬁrm (w∗
n,w∗
r)=
(z,z); the strategy of the worker (R∗
1,R ∗
2,ϕ ∗)=( z,z,0); and the beliefs (π∗
n,π∗
r)=( 0 ,1) constitute
a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. (ii) In the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium described in part (i),
all workers accept the ﬁrst oﬀer they receive and earn a wage, w∗
n, equal to the value of leisure,
z.
Theorem 4 implies that, when ﬁrms cannot observe the number of bidders participating in an
auction, there exists an equilibrium in which workers do not appropriate any of the gains from
trade. In other words, there is an equilibrium that generates the same allocation as in Diamond
(1971). The intuition is clear. In the equilibrium (σ∗
w,σ∗
f,π∗), every worker accepts the ﬁrst wage
oﬀer received. Therefore, when a ﬁrm meets a worker for the ﬁrst time, it reasonably believes
itself to be the sole bidder in which case it is optimal to oﬀer the monopsony wage. Moreover,
when a ﬁrm meets a worker for the second time, the ﬁrm knows that the other bidder believes
itself to be a monopsonist. Therefore, even in this case, the previously contacted ﬁrm ﬁnds it
optimal, given that the tie breaking rule goes to the recalled ﬁrm, to oﬀer the monopsony wage.
These observations taken together imply that a worker will never get an oﬀer higher than the
monopsony wage. Hence, the monopsony wage equals the value of leisure.
It is important to stress that Theorem 4 does not rule out the existence of equilibria in
19which the workers appropriate some of the gains from trade. The argument above does, however,
suggest that, in these other equilibria, there should be a strictly positive measure of workers who
reject the ﬁrst oﬀer they receive. In these other equilibria, when a ﬁrm meets a worker for the
ﬁrst time, it will be uncertain about its market power and the worker will be able to extract
some informational rents, as in Albrecht and Axel (1984), Burdett and Judd (1983), and Burdett
and Mortensen (1998). We leave the proof of existence (or the proof of non-existence) of these
equilibria for future research.
6. Conclusion
Economic rents arise when potential trading partners bilaterally meet each other in the presence
of search frictions. The way in which traders allocate these rents has profound consequences on
economic outcomes. For example, Diamond (1971) demonstrates that in a model with homoge-
neous goods and price setting, the selling ﬁrm obtains all of the gains to trade. In this model - one
that on the surface appears to be a natural framework - buyers have no incentive to participate.
Market breakdown or unravelling can occur.
This paper revisits wage setting in search models with take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers.4 The inno-
vation here is to allow job seekers to recall (at least to some extent) past encounters if they
decide to continue searching for employment opportunities. Provided recalled bidders can update
their oﬀers to take into account the number of employers pursuing the worker, such memory
fundamentally alters wage determination.
The Diamond (1971) search model and those that followed speciﬁed that if the traders fail
to agree to terms, potential partners lose all contact. Imposing no-recall is inconsequential if
previous bids are ﬁxed. When summoned again, inferior oﬀers do not become acceptable given
stationarity. On the other hand, with oﬀer updating as well as recall, a job seeker can potentially
improve the outcome of the auction. A worker who can recall bidders in order to engage them in
Bertrand competition has a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. A worker
with two competing suitors engages them in a bidding war that results in higher wages. Firms
avoid this outcome by oﬀering enough to the worker when the worker has no other bidders. With
recall, ﬁrms who encounter job seekers have to pay more than the value of unattached search to
4The aim of the paper is to demonstrate the importance of recall in models of job search, not to provide a
resolution to the Diamond paradox. The literature has identiﬁed several resolutions that do not rely on recall. For
example, Mortensen and Pissarides (1999a, 1999b) assume wages are the outcome of a bargain between ﬁrms and
workers. Moen (1997), Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001), Menzio and Shi (2009) solve the paradox by assuming that
search is directed rather than random. Albrecht and Axell (1984) solve the paradox by introducing heterogeneity
in the workers’ value of leisure.
20secure the worker’s services. The ability to recall previously eligible bidders provides the worker
with a counter weight to the ﬁrm’s advantages from wage setting as highlighted by the well-known
Diamond paradox. Rent sharing occurs.
Unlike other models with heterogeneous agents, the results are not sensitive to unraveling
with small search costs (Albrecht and Axell, 1984; Gaumont, Schindler and Wright, 2005). The
results are, however, sensitive to information veriﬁcation. Bidders must recognize the existence of
other bidders in the auction. Without knowing whether or not a worker truly has an alternative
suitor, employers must form beliefs about their competition. If a potential employer believes that
it is the lone bidder - a plausible conjecture in equilibrium - when it ﬁrst meets a worker, wages
revert to the monopsony outcome.
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A. Proof of Theorem 1
The main text established the existence of a unique Symmetric Equilibrium such that w1 ≥ R1
and w2 ≥ R2. Moreover, the main text also proved that this equilibrium has properties (i) — (iv)
listed in Theorem 1. It remains to prove that there are no Symmetric Equilibria such that either
w1 <R 1 or w2 <R 2.
Suppose that there exists a Symmetric Equilibrium such that w1 <R 1 and w2 <R 2.F r o mt h e
inequalities w1 <R 1 and w2 <R 2 and the fact that the value functions E0(w)and E1(w)a r e
strictly increasing in w, it follows that E0(w1) <E 0(R1)=U1 and E1(w2) <E 1(R2)=U1.T h e
latter inequalities and equation (2.2) imply that Ui = z/r for i =0 ,1. Finally, equation (2.1) and
U1 = z/r implies that E0(w)=( rw + δz)/[r(r + δ)]. Hence, the solution to the reservation wage
equation E0(w)=U1 is R1 = z.
Equations (2.3), (2.5) and the inequalities w1 <R 1 and w2 <R 2 imply that M1 = Cu
1 and
M2 = Cu
1/2. Equation (2.7) and M2 = Cu
1/2i m p l yCu
1 = 0. Finally, equation (2.6), Cu
1 =0a n d
R1 = z imply that J0(R1) − Cu
1 > 0. Hence, the solution to the wage oﬀer problem in (2.3) is
w1 = R1.S i n c ew1 = R1 contradicts the assumption w1 <R 1, there are no Symmetric Equilibria
in which w1 <R 1 and w2 <R 2. A similar proof by contradiction establishes that there are no
Symmetric Equilibria such that w1 <R 1 and w2 ≥ R2, and hence that there are no Symmetric
Equilibria such that w1 ≥ R1 and w2 <R 2.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
The proof of the theorem is divided into three claims.
Claim 1: In any Symmetric Equilibrium, Ui ≥ z/r for i =0 ,1,...N.
Proof: On the way to a contradiction, suppose that U0 <z / r .W h e n U0 <z / r ,e q u a t i o n
(2.2) implies that U0 >U 1 >. . . U N and max{EN(wN+1),U N} <U N. Since the latter inequality
fails, it must be the case that U0 ≥ z/r. Using a similar argument, we can prove Ui ≥ z/r for
i =1 ,2,...N.
Claim 2: In any Symmetric Equilibrium, U0 >z / r .
Proof: On the way to a contradiction, suppose that U0 = z/r.W h e n U0 = z/r,e q u a t i o n
(2.2) implies that Ui = z/r and Ei(wi+1) ≤ z/r for i =0 ,1,...N. Moreover, equation (2.1)
implies Ei(w)=( w +δz/r)/(r +δ)f o ri =1 ,2,...N. Hence, the solution to the reservation wage
24equation Ei−1(w)=Ui is Ri = z for i =1 ,2,...N+1 . Since Ri = z, equations (2.3)-(2.8) imply
Mi+1 ≤ (x − z)/(r + δ), Cu
i < (x − z)/(r + δ)a n dCe
i < (x − z)/(r + δ)f o ri =1 ,2,...N.N o w ,
notice that the equilibrium bid w2 is such that J1(w2)=Ce
1.S i n c eJ1(w)=( x − w)/(r + δ)a n d
Ce
i < (x−z)/(r +δ), w2 is strictly greater than z and E1(w2) >z / r .This contradicts one of the
implications of equation (2.2).
Claim 3: In any Symmetric Equilibrium, wi >zfor some i =1 ,2,...N+1 .
Proof: On the way to a contradiction, suppose that wi ≤ z for i =1 ,2,...N+1 . I nt h i sc a s e ,
equation (2.1) and (2.2) imply Ui = z/r for i =0 ,1,...N. This contradicts Claim 2.
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